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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
-vs.-

Plaintiff-Respondent,

JACK SYDDALL, JIMMIE JONES
and KENNETH PERRY,

Case
No.10953

Defenda1n.ts-Appella1n.ts.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellants, Jack E. Syddall, Jimmy Jones and
Kenneth Perry, were charged with the crime of Burglary
in the First Degree.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried by jury before the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley, Judge of the Second Judicial District
Court, on the 21st through 23rd day of March, 1967. Upon
the close of the State's case in chief, the trial court granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss the charge of Burglary in the First Degree, but denied defendants' Motion to dismiss the included offenses. The case was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty
1

of the crrme of Burglary in the Second Degree. On
March 31st, 1967, the trial judge sentenced all defendants
to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate sentences
provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek reversal of the conviction and
the judgment thereon.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants in this case were caught in the act of
attempting to break into the vault of the Clearfield State
Bank. The Clearfield State Bank was adjacent to the
Lockhart Company building, which in turn was adjacent
to the building occupied by the Barlow Furniture
Company. The buildings did not have common walls.
They were separate buildings, side by side in a row, but
each with its own walls. Lockhart was south of Barlow's and the bank was south of Lockhart (Plaintiff's
Ex. A, B, C, F; Tr. 70-71).
The evidence showed that the defendants had broken
into the Barlow Furniture building and then, by knocking
a hole through the wall of that building and the wall of
the Lockhart Company, gained access to the Lockhart
Company building. They then removed a portion of the
separate walls of the Lockhart Company and of the bank
building, exposing the vault in the bank which they apparently were about to drill and blast when they were
2

interrupted by the police. The vault backed flush against
the hole made in the bank wall, so that the defendants,
when arrested, had not "entered" the bank (Plaintiff's
Ex. B; Tr. 72). Received in evidence at the trial were
the items the defendants had with them. These were
more than ordinary burglary tools. They were special
"safe cracking" tools, including special drills to make
holes in the vault, dynamite to put in the holes, plastic
dough to seal in the dynamite, and electric wire, detonator caps and batteries to explode the dynamite (Plaintiff's Ex. E; Tr. 52-53). The explosives don't show on
the list of exhibits as counsel stipulated to them (Tr. 61).
The testimony in the record clearly indicates that the
defendants had no interest whatsoever in taking anything from the Lockhart Company. Nothing was disturbed except what was necessary to gain access to the
"\rnll next to the bank. A small vault was ignored despite
the fact that it was in plain view and the defendants had
ample tools to open it (Tr. 77, 103-105).
The testimony regarding Barlow Furniture like·wise
indicated that the store was not ransacked (Tr. 77, 78).
The State, as an afterthought, did recall the owner to testify that some coins that were in an open cash drawer
were missing (Tr. 124). However, there was no evidence
that any of the defendants, who were caught at the
scene, had taken the coins. A desperation attempt to
mislead the jury by having an officer testify that one of
the defendants had $20.47 in "coinage" at the jail (Tr.
128), failed when it was brought out that the amount
included currency and coins, and the officer did not know
3

how much of each there was (Tr. 129). Prior to the
time the loss was noticed at least fifteen other people had
been through the building (Tr. 79, 125).
The evidence of an intent to steal from the Clearfield State Bank was overwhelming. Two of the defendants had been seen "casing" the bank two days earlier
(Tr. 15-17). The police and sheriff had prior knowledge that the burglary of the bank was planned (Tr. 8385). At the time the police closed in, work was progressing on the bank vault and all the tools were found
around that area (Tr. 77-78). Further, the tools were
of a type designed to drill cement (Tr. 78), which was
the material used in the bank vault. The admission of
appellant Perry that his expected share from the "job"
was "30 grand" (Tr. 96), certainly ref erred to the bank
as the intended source. In the words of the prosecutor
who tried the case, "to be perfectly frank, the greater
part, and the massive part of the evidence, is that their
intent was to break in the bank" (R. 73 at pg. 4).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
APPELLANTS' CONVICTION IS INVALID
BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT GIVEN A PRELIMINARY HEARING NOR NOTICE OF THE
ACCUSATION OF THE CRIME OF WHICH
THEY WERE ULTIMATELY CONVICTED.

It is obvious that the defendants could have been
convicted of attempted first-degree burglary of the bank.
A charge of completed burglary of the bank would uot
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lie because their attempt was interrupted by the police
before the bank was entered (Tr. 72). No charge of firstdegree burglary, complete or attempted, would lie as to
Lockhart or Barlow, because explosives were not to be
used in them. The State, however, did charge the defendants with a completed act of first-degree burglary.
It did this by combining in a single charge the explosives
intended for the bank with the actual entry of Barlow and
Lockhart, by charging burglary in the first degree by
entering Lockhart and Barlow, but with the intent being
to commit larceny by use of explosives in the bank.
The original Information got in the way by stating
that the intent for entering Barlow and Lockhart was to
commit larceny "therein" (R 24). To cure this, the State
brought a motion to delete the word "therein," so as not
to limit the proof to Lockhart and Barlow. At the hearing on this motion, the State candidly admitted "The major part of the evidence will indicate that the intent was
to commit larceny in Clearfield Bank. So the word
'therein' would limit the meaning of the Information"
(R. 73, pg. 3).
In answer to the court's inquiry about whether that
was a change in the charge upon which defendants were
hound over, the State's attorney alleged that the charge
had always been intent to steal from the Clearfield Bank
and, ''I know there was no evidence adduced [at the preliminary hearing] relating to the intent to commit larceny any other place other than the Clearfield State

5

Bank" (R. 73, pg. 5). The preliminary hearings were
not recorded, so have no transcript.
Admittedly, the intent to commit larceny in the
Clearfield State Bank was never specified literally in the
written pleadings. Nonetheless, defendants were certainly led to believe that they were accused of intending
to commit larceny in the bank, when that was the sole
evidentiary basis for the bindover, and the claim of the
State's attorney in open court.
Defendant's counsel accordingly prepared for trial
on the following theories (subsequently proven correct) :
First, the charge of first-degree burglary would fail because there was no completed burglary of the bank, and
an intent to use explosives on the bank didn't prove firstdegree burglary of Barlow or Lockhart because as to
them, proof of burglary requires proof of an intent to
commit the acts within the buildings entered; Second, the
lesser offenses of second- or third-degree burglary of
Barlow and Lockhart would fail because there was no
proof of any actual or intended burglary of them. The
trial court agreed with the former theory and dismissed
the charge of first-degree burglary of Lockhart and Barlow. The State has not appealed this ruling. As to the
latter theory, concerning the lesser offenses, the court
let second-degree burglary go to the jury because the
State, after calling and releasing the owner of Barlow's
as a witness, recalled him to testify that some coins had
been taken from his store (Tr. 124, 125).
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This was a new charge. Previously the evidence, and
elements of law, had been concerned with the intent to
steal from the bank. Neither preliminary hearing, nor
any stage of the proceedings to that point, had given any
intimation to defendants that the State would try to
prove an actual or intended theft from Barlow or Lockhart. The new State's evidence came rather late in the
trial. The previous witnesses had been examined by defendants as to whether or not there was an actual entry
of the bank, or whether or not explosives were used at
Barlow or Lockhart. Now a new element was in the case.
There had been no examination of the witnesses on this
new element and these witnesses were now excused.
These were the investigating police officers and the
aggrieved parties, and of course defendants did not dare
call them as their own witnesses without the right of
cross-examination. The new element was whether or not
the defendants took the coins, or whether, between 9 :00
p.m., when the defendants entered, and the next business
day, when Mr. Barlow found the coins were missing,
other persons, such as policemen, newspapermen, insurance men, employees, friends, neighbors, spectators, or
the curious might have had the opportunity to take the
coins. If it is claimed that a person steals a missing
item, but that missing item is not traced to him in any
way, the fact that many other people also had the opportunity to take it, makes the evidence less than clear and
convincing that the accused took it. The defendants did
the best they could with the witnesses that the State had
left to call, but were not able to cover this issue adequately.
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The effect of the above was that appellants were
never given a preliminary hearing on the issue as it
went to the jury and were not given notice of the crime
of which they were convicted. Following the amendment
made in district court, defense counsel declined an offer
to remand for another preliminary hearing, but this was
an offer for another preliminary hearing based on the
Clearfield State Bank (R. 73). Certainly defendants
could not have waived their right to preliminary hearing
on the new charge when they were not even aware of it
until near the close of the State's case.
The situation in the instant case is similar to that
in State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 Pac. 1085 (1908). In
that case, the defendant had been bound over on a charge
of fornication. The Information was quashed because
of the statute of limitations, but a new Information was
filed alleging a more recent date and the defendant was
convicted. This court reversed on the ground that no
evidence of the act of which defendant was convicted was
presented at the preliminary hearing. The court stated
that a person cannot be bound over on one crime and
convicted of another even though they may be similar in that case, the same parties and the same act at a different time.
Not only were appellants deprived of their preliminary hearing but also the right ''to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against" them. Utah Const.
Art. I, Sec. 12. Appellanfa rely upon State v. Myers, 5
Utah 2d 365, 302 P.2d 276 (1956). In that case, the prosecution, in a bill of particulars, had committed itself to a
8

total value of less than $50.00 of property taken from a
victim in one count of a grand larceny Information, while
alleging over $50.00 taken from another victim in another
count. At trial, the State proved over $50.00 on the first
and was unable to prove the second. The conviction was
reversed because of the fatal variance. In that case the
State undoubtedly argued that all they had done was
switch the amounts and the victims and the defendant
was convicted on evidence that would support the charge
of grand larceny. The court reasoned it was not fair to
lull the defendant into a sense of security by alleging one
count they could not prove and another that was not a
felony and then changing the situation at trial. The
court stated the provisions of §77-21-43, UCA, 1953, (variance between pleading and proof) do not overrule the
requirements of the constitution.

POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF
SECOND-DEGREE BURGLARY OF THE
BARLOW FURNITURE COMPANY AND THE
LOCKHART COMPANY.
The ruling of the trial court that burglary requires
an intent to commit larceny within the building entered is
amply supported by the authorities cited in defendants'
brief submitted to that court. Since the State has not
appealed that ruling, appellants will not re-argue that
question here.
9

It is obvious that the State set out to prove, and did
prove attempted first-degree burglary of the bank. This
was not charged. Being precluded from a conviction of
that crime, the State got a conviction for another crime
which was not proven - burglary of Lockhart and Barlow. Defendants contend that the jury did not have sufficient evi<lence upon which to find them guilty, but that
the jury was motivated by a desire "to do justice" in
the face of the evidence that the defendants were committing a serious crime although not the one charged.
Only the State presented evidence. Its evidence
pointed to a professionally planned and executed attempt to burglarize the bank. The defendants broke into
Barlow's around 9 :30 p.m. (Tr. 34), and by 10 :20 p.m.
(Tr. 73) had pierced two groups of walls made up of layers of brick and masonry (Ex. B, C, F; R. 69, 70, 71).
This State's evidence shows an intensity of labor of
phenomenal proportions that bespeaks only a singleminded purpose to get into the bank vault as quickly as
possible. They anticipated a reward of $30,000.00 each
(Tr. 96), and made no effort to burglarize safes, drawers or cash registers in Barlow or Lockhart (Tr. 77, 78,
103-105).
The State did show that approximately $15.00 to
$17.00 in nickels, dimes and quarters was stolen from a
cash register which had been left open by management
of Barlow Furniture (Tr. 124). This testimony was given
by Mr. Barlow, owner of the store. He had previously
been called and released as a State's witness. He was
then recalled for this purpose. The complex of buildings
10

had been surrounded by the Police before the defendants
were called on to surrender and no defendant left the
building prior to their arrest. They were searched at
the scene and again when they went to the jail. The coins
were never found. The record is not clear on when Mr.
Barlow discovered the loss of the coins, but apparently it
was a long time after the apprehension of the defendants.
During that time a number of other people had been in
the Barlow Furniture store (Tr. 79, 125). Accordingly,
the defendants might or might not have taken the coins.
There is no proof that they did. Although inferential and
based on common sense, it would seem that none of the
defendants saw or touched the coins for several reasons.
First, they were after the vault and working hard on that
job. Second, the coins apparently were removed from
the premises, as they were never recovered. The defendants couldn't have done this. Third, $15.00 to $17.00
in small change adds up to a very large pocketfull. Despite this, and despite the fact that although not immediately, but within the next day, the police were aware
of the disappearance of the coins, the arresting officers
and jailer failed to connect the coins with any of the defendants, which is remarkable if any of the defendants
had had possession of them. The State apparently was
aware of the weakness of this point because, in an effort
to mislead the jury, an officer testified that one of the defendants had $20.47 in "coinage" at the jail (Tr. 128).
This effort failed, or even boomeranged, when it was
brought out that the officer had counted the money the
defendant had on him, but couldn't testify that he had
more than $.47 in change and that the rest might have
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been currency. If the defendant had had that sum of
change, it is most probable that the officer would have
noted it on the booking envelope in which the defendant's
possessions were put, or that it \Vould have been picked
up subsequently in the envelope when Mr. Barlow reported it (Tr.128, 129). The defendants were searched at
the scene. The officer making the search would have felt
the large hard bulge the coins would make, investigate,
find and report them. Yet there is no evidence connecting
the coins to the defendants.
That the jury convicted on this evidence, only indicates that the good jurors of Davis County were reluctant
to turn the defendants loose on society because of a
"technicality," to wit, that they were charged with the
wrong crime. However, as this court stated in State v.
Ta.ylor, 14 Utah 2d 107, 378 P.2d 107 (1963).
In a criminal proceeding it is not sufficient to
show merely that the accused has been dishonest,
or that he is a cheater, or otherwise of bad character. He is entitled to be charged with a specific
crime so that he may know the "nature and cause
of the accusation against him," and the State
must prove substantially as charged the offense
it relies upon for conviction.
The judgment must stand or fall upon the
proof, or lack thereof, of the crime which the
State charged the defendant, essayed to prove,
and of which lie stands convicted ....
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If the appellants are to serve prison sentences for
attempting to burglarize the bank, they should be charged
and convicted of that crime.

Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL KING
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Kenneth Perry,
Defendant-Appellant
JOHN D. 0 'CONNELL
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Jack E. Syddall
and Jimmie Jon,es,
Defendarnts-Appellarn,ts
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